Detection theory has been applied to a host of varied problems (for example, measuring the accuracy of diagnostic systems or reliability of lie detection tests) and extends far beyond the detection of signals. This book is a primer on the subject.

In this clear and up-to-date introduction, Thomas D. Senor lays the philosophical foundation needed to understand the justification of memory belief. This book explores traditional accounts of the justification of memory belief and examines the resources that prominent positions in contemporary epistemology have to offer theories of the memorial justification. Along the way, epistemic conservatism, evidentialism, foundationalism, phenomenal conservatism, reliabilism, and preservationism all feature. Study Questions and annotated Further Reading guides at the end of each chapter make this book (...) ideal for classroom use and independent study. Written in very clear prose, A Critical Introduction to the Epistemology of Memory is a valuable resource for students approaching epistemology for the first time or those looking to advance their understanding of a core area of philosophy. (shrink)

A primary fiduciary bond, rarely examined, is that of neighbor. I distinguish this bond from others that may overlap it, those of fellow citizen or compatriot. I argue that the nature of moral identity and the nature of moral formation require moral agents to acknowledge the fiduciary duties of neighbor.

In this paper, I offer a defense of what I dub “religious rationality pluralism”—that is, that people of various religions can be rational in holding a variety of religious perspectives. I distinguish two arguments against this position: the Uniqueness argument and the Disagreement argument. The aims of this essay are to argue that the Uniqueness thesis is ambiguous between two readings, that while one version of the thesis is quite plausible, it cannot be successfully used to argue against rationality pluralism, (...) and the version of the thesis that would support the argument is false. (shrink)

The God that our age is revealing to us is one Who asks new questions, challenges men anew, calls to deeper honesty and better service.

Most arguments about conscientious objections in medicine fail to capture the full scope and complexity of the concept before drawing conclusions about their permissibility in practice. Arguments favoring and disfavoring the accommodation of conscientious objections in practice tend to focus too narrowly on prima facie morally contentious treatments and religious claims of conscience, while further failing to address the possibility of moral perspectives changing over time. In this paper, I argue that standard reasons against permitting conscientious objections in practice—that their (...) permission may result in harm to patients, the idea that medical providers willingly enter into the medical field, and that conscientious objections stand contrary to medical professionalism—do not apply in all cases and that the medical field and health systems in which many physicians now practice should continue to tolerate conscientious objections in practice. (shrink)

This narrative symposium examines the relationship of bioethics practice to personal experiences of illness. A call for stories was developed by Tod Chambers, the symposium editor, and editorial staff and was sent to several commonly used bioethics listservs and posted on the Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics website. The call asked authors to relate a personal story of being ill or caring for a person who is ill, and to describe how this affected how they think about bioethical questions and the (...) practice of medicine. Eighteen individuals were invited to submit full stories based on review of their proposals. Twelve stories are published in this symposium, and six supplemental stories are published online only through Project MUSE. Authors explore themes of vulnerability, suffering, communication, voluntariness, cultural barriers, and flaws in local healthcare systems through stories about their own illnesses or about caring for children, partners, parents and grandparents. Commentary articles by Arthur Frank, Bradley Lewis, and Carol Taylor follow the collection of personal narratives. (shrink)

There are a number of grounds for criticizing what the state requires of one, and for thinking that one no longer has an obligation to obey it. I will begin by attempting to locate liberalism amongst such grounds. It is useful for this purpose to contrast two headings under which these grounds may fall. Firstly, there are criticisms concerning the content of the requirements of the state. In this case exception is taken to what it is that the law requires (...) quite apart from the process by which it was arrived at. If Jews are legally prevented from practising certain professions, and objection is taken because no state should make laws debarring persons from certain professions on religious grounds, the objection is one of content. Secondly, there are grounds concerning the procedure by which a decision was reached. If it is thought that the British Government ought not to have signed the Treaty of Rome because no referendum was taken on whether the electorate wanted Britain to join, exception is taken to the procedure by which this decision was made. The objection could be made by one who thought that British entry was the best policy. liberalism lays down principles concerning the permissible content of what is required by the state. (shrink)

Professor Frey expresses surprise at my assertion that, ultimately, nothing is provable in ethics. What about Pol Pot’s atrocities, he asks—surely we can all condemn them? Let us take a more recent example, the Beslan school massacre. The terrorists appear to have weighed against the unquestionably serious harm to the children the boost to their cause which they judged the attendant publicity would achieve. I may believe that even to attempt such a utilitarian assessment is obscene, and most would no (...) doubt agree. I cannot, however, prove that this is the wrong approach. A few people, at least, take a different view.The example shows the problem with utilitarian assessments where the harm is both certain and direct, the victims and beneficiaries are wholly distinct and the victims have no say in the assessment—precisely the pattern with vivisection.I do not, of course, advocate an ethical free for all. As I …. (shrink)

This paper aims to demonstrate how public disclosure can be used to balance physicians9 conscientious objections with their professional obligations to patients – specifically respect for patient autonomy and informed consent. It is argued here that physicians should be permitted to exercise conscientious objections, but that they have a professional obligation to provide advance notification to patients about those objections. It is further argued here that public disclosure is an appropriate and ethically justifiable limit to the principle of advance notification. (...) The argument for publicly disclosing physicians9 conscientious objections is made in this paper by discussing three practical benefits of public disclosure in medicine, and then addressing how publicly disclosing physicians9 conscientious objections is not an undue invasion of privacy. Three additional concerns with public disclosure of physicians9 conscientious objections are briefly addressed – potential harassment of physicians, workplace discrimination, and mischaracterising physicians9 professional aptitude – concluding that each of these concerns requires further deliberation in the realm of business ethics. (shrink)

This book is the first study to focus on the reception of Paul's link between resurrection and salvation, revealing its profound effect on early Christian theology - not only eschatology, but also anthropology, pneumatology, ethics, and soteriology. Thomas D. McGlothlin traces the roots of the strong tension on the matter in ancient Judaism and then offers deep readings of the topic by key theologians of pre-Nicene Christianity, who argued on both sides of the issue of the fleshliness of the (...) resurrected body. McGlothlin unravels the surprising continuities that emerge between Irenaeus, Origen, and the Valentinians, as well as deep disagreements between allies like Irenaeus and Tertullian. (shrink)

In the context of Eddic mythological poetry, Rígsþula is strikingly anomalous. The poem speaks of an otherwise unknown god, Rígr, whom the prose preface identifies with the Norse god Heimdallr. He visits in sequence three households. The first is that of Ái and Edda, whose names mean “great grandfather” and “great grandmother”; the second that of Afi and Amma, “grandfather” and “grandmother”; the third that of Faðir and Móðir, “father” and “mother.” Rígr spends three nights in bed with each couple, (...) and from these unions spring þræll, Karl, and Jarl, forebears of the races of slaves, freemen, and nobles. The poem concludes with an account of Konr, youngest son of Jarl, who is apparently about to establish himself as a king when the poem breaks off. (shrink)

The term “euthanasia” is used in conflicting ways in the bioethical literature, as is the term “assisted suicide,” resulting in definitional confusion, ambiguities, and biases which are counterproductive to ethical and legal discourse. I aim to rectify this problem in two parts. Firstly, I explore a range of conflicting definitions and identify six disputed definitional factors, based on distinctions between (1) killing versus letting die, (2) fully intended versus partially intended versus merely foreseen deaths, (3) voluntary versus nonvoluntary versus involuntary (...) decisions, (4) terminally ill versus non-terminally ill patients, (5) patients who are fully conscious versus those in permanent comas or persistent vegetative states, and (6) patients who are suffering versus those who are not. Secondly, I distil these factors into six “building blocks” and combine them to develop an unambiguous, value-neutral taxonomy of “end-of-life practices.” I hope that this taxonomy provides much-needed clarification and a solid foundation for future ethical and legal discourse. (shrink)

I examine one theme within Tom Morawetz's complex jurisprudential work (stemming from Wittgenstein): the concept of a practice. After considering this theme in some detail, I then sketch a different jurisprudential approach that still proceeds within the inspiration of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Here, I summarise Stanley Cavell's elaborate recounting of Wittgenstein's twin concepts, “criteria” and “grammar.” In a third and final section, I employ this alternative method to provide a brief example of how a Wittgensteinian approach might be made towards (...) explicating and understanding Holmes’ classic claim regarding the need in jurisprudence to separate legal and moral concepts. (shrink)

The essay “The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief‘ is a bold argument for the irrationality of “first-order‘ religious belief. However, unlike those associated with “New Atheism,‘ the paper’s authors Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican claim both that there are prospects for rational “second-order‘ religious belief and that religious belief and practice can play a positive role in human life. In response to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, Janusz Salamon has argued that (...) first- order religious belief can be rational, although not via the methods that philosophers who have typically defended the reasonability of faith have appealed to. Both papers are fascinating discussions of the epistemology of religious belief in general, and of the rationality of such commitment in light of modern science and religious disagreement in particular. In this paper, I’ll object to a few points made in each essay and argue that neither paper provides good reason to be dubious about the religious belief being rational along traditional lines. (shrink)